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Climate Change and Hybrid Warfare Strategies
Abstract
Concepts of hybrid warfare and climate security are contested on their own, and are rarely
considered as connected in planning for future security risks. Yet climate change presents
new hazards for national security, and opportunities for those looking to foment instability
and uncertainty in traditional institutions. This article examines the connections between
climate change risks and hybrid war strategies, and focuses on concepts of resilience
targeting, information warfare, and geoengineering, illustrating that ‘full spectrum’
analyses of security are necessary in developing future security strategies.
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Introduction
National security discussions of climate change and hybrid warfare have
barely intersected, despite both being highly visible in discussions of the
changing nature of conflict and security. When climate changes are
referenced it is typically in the context of how shifting environmental
conditions can accelerate certain components of hybrid warfare, such as
terrorism, a watered down version of the original conception of climate
security as a threat multiplier in security foresight.1 Yet despite the lack of
obvious connections between the concepts, climate security and hybrid
warfare are linked in key areas. The difficulty in seeing these links leaves
security organizations vulnerable to the associated risks. This article
briefly outlines relevant concepts of climate security and hybrid warfare,
and discusses connections between climate change and information
warfare, attempts to control resources, and geoengineering technologies.
In contrast to traditional conceptions of strategic security in terms of
military action, climate change highlights the ways in which not only
human security is put at risk, but also how actors can take advantage of or
force environmental changes in order to undermine adversaries. While
Sun Tzu wrote that creating vulnerabilities in one’s opponent is too costly,
he made an exception with exploitation of environmental factors.2 In the
twenty-first century, we likewise see opportunities for asymmetric action
against opponents by opening environmental vulnerabilities.
One of the important contributions that hybrid warfare theorists have
made is to widen the concepts of security beyond the standard images of
violence and conflict (for example, kinetic warfare), and to argue that
increasingly one witnesses coordinated actions across a spectrum of
activities, from traditional military actions to cyberattacks, criminal
networks, disinformation campaigns, and terrorism. Some analysts argue
that hybrid conflicts are not necessarily new, that asymmetric and
irregular warfare have existed for ages, while others point out the
increased coordination across different spaces, including leveraging cyber
technologies and social media.3 Despite these differences, there is wide
agreement that the United States and NATO-centric political concepts of
conflict fail to capture the wide range of potential threats and risks
inherent in contemporary security.4 The formal definitions of hybrid
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warfare in the US took place at the same time that intelligence analysts
called for full spectrum analyses to reflect the complexity of conflict in
areas like Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in many ways mirror strategic
doctrines developed by the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of
China (PRC).5
Specifically, the Russian Federation has long used concepts of maskirovka
in operations and strategy, meaning the masking of identity and goal of
using proxies when available, and not admitting attribution even in cases
where actions are linked to the government.6 The Russian military
occupation of the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine in 2014 was the clearest
example of these approaches, but they have continued in its cyber,
military, and counter-intelligence operations in the region and abroad.7
Similarly, though with a slightly different emphasis from Russia’s
maskirovka or Gerimasov Doctrine, is the PRC’s concept of unrestricted
warfare. Based on insurgency experiences of the Chinese Communist
forces in the 1940s and codified more recently in 1999, unrestricted
warfare is a strategy of using all possible tools to engage an opponent
asymmetrically, from political and legal warfare to traditional kinetic
operations.8 American concepts of wider warfare, such as multi-domain
operations (MDO), still tend to focus on military operations and not the
broader array of potential actors or actions.
Discussions over climate change as a security risk have encountered
similar issues, namely that the concept of climate security often is defined
in terms of how much climate-induced environmental changes increase
the risks of violent conflict.9 While the focus on violent conflict in climate
security is common in academia, in contrast the applied military
definitions of climate security tend to focus more on human security, and
try to identify areas in which environmental changes affect operational or
strategic goals. In this sense, climate as a cause of conflict is not viewed as
a primary factor, but it remains vitally important for understanding a wide
variety of logistical and intelligence risks, from future humanitarian
assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations, to infrastructure
risks, force protection (for example, extreme heat events, emerging
diseases), search-and-rescue (SAR), and energy supplies.10 Where extreme
environmental changes do threaten social stability, such as a major famine
or shifting monsoon rains, the military planning view has been that
46
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responding to complex disasters is a severe drain on resources, and that
other agencies heading off such futures is the best course of action, not
preparing for additional kinetic scenarios.11
While the logistical and humanitarian risks that fall under human security
concepts may not appear as salient as violent conflict to some, this is the
same criticism made by hybrid warfare analysts. Essentially, focusing
primarily on violent conflict and traditional kinetic warfare, and ignoring
coordinated actions in the grey zones of activity that fall under the
threshold of military response, leaves vulnerable many societies and
communities to impacts that fall under the wider concepts of human,
energy or cyber security. These vulnerable areas are where security may be
most at risk, and yet analysts risk ignoring events that fall outside of
traditional definitions of security. Climate-induced environmental changes
can pose hazards from massive wildfires to flooding, from crop failure to
energy blackouts, from pandemic disease to increased risks of tsunamis.12
Not only do climatic changes pose risks to security on these more
fundamental levels, they are also the areas, which are leveraged as tools for
entities employing hybrid warfare strategies. Environmental changes also
overlap with strategies that can widen insurgency and conflict potential,
from forced migration of refugees, resource capture (including food),
destruction of infrastructure (urbicide), and other actions that undermine
community well-being and cohesiveness.13

Resilience Targeting
In conducting assessments of post-conflict regions and reconstruction, a
pattern emerged that suggested many actions taken during a conflict were
designed not to target military units, or even civilians directly, but were
intended to prevent communities from being able to recover from the
conflict. By attacking or blocking access to critical nodes in essential
systems, aggressors could exploit key vulnerabilities and actively target
those factors that constituted resilience and the ability of systems to
recover following a conflict. The specific tactics could vary, from sowing
landmines in agricultural areas, destroying environmental or health
infrastructure (for example, wastewater treatment facilities), or
undercutting livelihoods, this practice of resilience targeting often

47
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4

occurred in civil wars and was tied to policies of ethnic cleansing. 14
Similar tactics are observed in hybrid warfare environments. Hybrid
warfare strategies are often employed in asymmetric conflicts, where the
less powerful actor takes advantage of the adversary’s vulnerabilities to
create instability and disruption. As resilience is a key component of
vulnerability, actively undercutting resilience of critical systems
automatically increases associated vulnerabilities, whether the ability to
withstand outside attacks, maintain social, political, and economic
stability, or to recover following a disaster. In a general sense, any
reduction of resilience in a society or its underlying support systems
increases that society’s vulnerability to emerging hazards linked to climate
change. When Ukrainian society, for example, is polarized through social
media and disinformation campaigns, energy utilities suffer cyberattacks,
financial systems are delegitimized and fail, the country loses its ability to
develop climate mitigation policies or respond to hazards such as extreme
heat events.
On a more specific level, however, hybrid warfare tools are employed in
spaces opened by climate related stresses. One key component that
Hoffman and others identified in the application of hybrid warfare has
been the criminal element and this may serve as an example of the
synergistic effects between climate change and deliberate efforts to
destabilize a region or system.15 To take one example, as drought and
desertification affect farmers in central Africa near Lake Chad, criminal
and terrorist networks such as Boko Haram can take advantage of the
stresses for both recruitment and human trafficking.16 Human trafficking
of refugees not only creates its own crisis, it is used as a weapon to divide
societies and destination countries whether in North Africa or southern
Europe. This division works best when tied with a coordinated
disinformation campaign that frames the existence of refugees as a
national, cultural, or existential threat, rather than a humanitarian crisis. 17
Criminal networks can also destabilize regions by focusing on livelihood
and environmental resources, from fisheries to illegal trade in wildlife.
The Northern Triangle of Central America (including Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador) may be another example where criminal
networks have both destabilized a region and taken advantage of unstable
48
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conditions. Research strongly suggests that climate changes have impacts
on levels of crime, and that in Central America migration toward the
United States is linked to both environmental changes and those taking
advantage of resulting disruption.18 Deforestation and destruction of
agricultural land, to take one example, links both larger environmental
changes and narco-crime syndicates and local control of land by criminal
networks.19 Coupled with problems of corruption, outside interference by
groups (whether nation-states or corporations), and colonial legacies of
power structures and economics, it is difficult for countries for develop the
capacity and legitimacy to address these non-traditional security
dynamics. Note that the criminalization framework can be misused, by
framing adaptation strategies following stresses or disasters as threats to
national security.20 The focus should remain on vulnerable populations
and systems. For entities looking to destabilize the legitimacy of governing
institutions, undercutting basic needs such as food, water, and livelihoods
can be an effective component of a wider campaign.21
In this sense, climate change is not the cause of conflict, but drives an
array of stressors that can be exploited by those looking to profit from
uncertainty and instability during or prior to a conflict. An adversary that
is deeply divided and unable to cope with disasters may be less formidable
an opponent. With natural hazards increasing in scope and intensity in
many areas, from extreme heat to flooding and/or drought, undercutting
response and perhaps even sparking disasters may be an effective
approach for an aggressor who either lacks traditional military
capabilities, or wishes to remain hidden and attribute blame elsewhere.
Such approaches, however, work best when actors attack resilience not
only on a physical basis, but also in the informational space.

Information A2AD
The concept of anti-access and area denial (A2AD) refers to methods by
which an adversary denies an opponent the ability to operate in or enter a
contested territory. In modern usage, it has often referred to concerns over
the Chinese military’s efforts to threaten U.S. naval forces in regions like
the South China Sea, a region in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have used hybrid strategies
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(for example, maritime militia) and island construction (more below) to
shift the nature of control and security.22 One could also conceive of
information A2AD, however, or ways in which adversaries are able to deny
the usual access to and control of informational and cyber spaces. Beyond
the traditional denial of service (DoS) attacks on information technology,
hybrid warfare can encompass additional attacks that undermine trust in
areas like financial services (for example, ransomware and identify theft),
navigation (Global Positioning Systems), and medical records. In the
climate change realm, attacks can be systematically carried out to question
to validity of climate-related scientific data and research, and in so doing
even physically deny access to certain regions for military operations.
Campaigns against climate science are not new, and in recent court cases
have traced such attacks back to oil companies in the 1970s.23
Increasingly, attacks on the validity of climate science are carried out by
state and non-state actors as part of coordinated efforts to bolster
insecurity. Actors employ techniques of uncertainty amplification, cyber
aggression against individual scientists, and media campaigns to
manufacture conspiracies related to everything from George Soros to
chemtrails to weather control at Air Force facilities. Strategic reasons exist
for doing so. For state relying heavily on oil and gas exports for
government revenue, large-scale policy shifts to invest in renewable
technologies and divest from fossil fuel industries, creates an existential
threat to the well-being of the state. If, for example, the European Union
responds to climate change by investing more in solar and wind
technologies, this can directly affect the strength of the Russian state
(where the oil and gas sector pay nearly forty percent of government
revenues \The more uncertainty that can be inserted into discussions over
climate change, the more that scientists are linked to conspiracy theories,
the less likely abrupt policy changes will be made that move from
dependence on fossil fuel sources.24
Intelligence agencies in Russia and petrostates have been linked to climate
change disinformation campaigns, and the United States and Canadian
governments have not been immune from such actions.25 Where the goals
of such disinformation campaigns is disruption of actions to respond to
climate change related risks, and where such actions have implications for
disaster or military preparedness, they can constitute components of
50
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hybrid warfare actions. For example, politicization over the existence of
climate change in the United States has led the White House to remove all
references to climate change from the National Security Strategy, and the
recently released Air Force Arctic strategy contained only three mentions
of climate change (and all bundled with the term weather).26 The idea
behind referring to A2AD info ops is not that information spaces will be
completely off-limits to certain countries, but in the case of climate change
and other scientific issues, social media spaces and even academic
research have been flooded with strident anti-science voices that can
overwhelm discussion, while political pressures have resulted in climaterelated data and websites being taken down by government officials. 27
The potential implications are that the U.S. Navy (whose Task Force
Climate Change was shut down in 2019), Air Force, and Coast Guard are
constrained in their abilities to discuss key factors in operational and
strategic planning for the region.28 Large-scale loss of sea ice, melting
permafrost, changes to Arctic shipping, all require investment in
capabilities and/or consideration of lost infrastructure (for example,
damage to runways due to permafrost melt), slowing the United States
response and leaving open space for Russian and Chinese operations in
the region. Denying domain awareness is a long-standing strategy in
military operations, and the anti-science campaigns promoted by outside
actors accelerate the inability of actors to avoid seeing clearly in rapidly
changing regions like the Arctic.

Shifting the Groundwork
One of the more notable tools used in hybrid warfare in recent years has
been the construction of new territory by the People’s Republic of China
inside the South China Sea, and establishment of military bases to assert
control over exclusive economic zones. While ruled illegal by both courts
in The Hague and by the U.S. State Department, among others, the PRC
has skirted traditions of how countries claim control of territory and
resources, taking advantage of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions while
at the same time ignoring its prescriptions. This island terraforming is part
of a larger strategic approach by the PRC to obtain control of natural
resources, including fossil fuels, rare earth minerals, and especially food.
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With concerns over food insecurity and availability of water and land,
China has not been alone in making concerted efforts to obtain control of
land overseas.29
Foreign control of land is nothing new. European colonial powers shifted
entire agrarian economies to accommodate cash crop exports, and United
States companies controlled large parts of Central America through the
mid-20th century. Similar patterns now emerge with corporations wresting
control of land and crops away from local governments, sometimes with
enormous political consequences such as the South Korean company
Daewoo’s attempts to lease over half of all agricultural land in
Madagascar.30 What may be concerning for the future would be new
approaches to control of land, water and resources in response to climate
change pressures, elements of which are already evident. It is possible for
actors to carry out coordinated campaigns using tools mentioned above,
combining resilience targeting, human trafficking, and information
warfare, in order to wrest control of territory that they then expand upon
as security operations. While governments, corporations, terrorist and
criminal networks have taken advantage of disasters in the past, new
technologies are emerging that may allow the disasters to be engineered by
those same actors.
While geoengineering technologies have long been the work of science
fiction, the ability to use technology to affect and control solar radiation
management (SRM) of certain parts of the globe are increasingly close to
reality. The concept behind SRM is to deploy technologies, such as
stratospheric nanoparticles, to reflect the sun’s rays away from the earth,
or to direct solar radiation onto selected regions to warm it more quickly.31
While cost, feasibility, and control issues are highly uncertain, from a
security perspective three critical issues emerge.
The first hybrid-climate security issue is that geoengineering technologies,
if deployed in the future, may not be controlled by traditional space
agencies like NASA or the European Space Agency (ESA). Geotech
research is often being undertaken by corporations, in part because
national governments may be constrained by legal conventions such as
ENMOD (Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques), but also because no
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governance mechanisms exist to address use of these new technologies.32
It would be entirely possible, to use a hypothetical example, for Pakistan to
contract SpaceX to deploy technologies developed by China, in an attempt
to prevent further melt of Himalayan glaciers. The issue is that no clear
responsibility may exist, or mechanism for ‘downstream’ groups affected
to protest such actions through formal channels.
The lack of governance leads into the second critical issue, which is that of
mis- and disinformation. With geoengineering technologies lacking clear
cause and effect, and with conspiracies already circulating concerning such
technologies, attribution for environmental events and disasters are open
to exploitation. In the above example, even if the deployment of
technology had no actual effect on Himalayan glaciers, any subsequent
change in the Indian monsoon could be blamed on Pakistan, the United
States, or China. Exploiting disasters for political gain is a common tactic,
but the point is that technology to address climate change can open space
for existing hybrid strategies against countries or societies. The third
problem is that there may be some kernel of truth in such geoengineering
concerns. It may be possible to employ such technologies in a deliberate
attempt to disrupt climate, weather, or ecosystem stability, or even just to
give the appearance of doing so. Turning such technologies into a weapon
is not beyond the realm of possibility, particularly if the strategic goal is
disruption itself.33
If the strategic goal of hybrid warfare is to stoke instability in a region or
system, to keep it off balance by exploiting available technologies and
vulnerabilities, these new approaches to terraforming and geoengineering
allow disruptive actors to exploit climate change in ways that are difficult
for states and communities to defend against or even anticipate. With
climate change (via sea level rise) already shifting land and maritime
borders, and natural processes and hazards no longer following historical
patterns, these uncertainties will be easy to take advantage of or
accelerate.

Conclusion
The disruptions that climate-related environmental changes pose to
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military operations and strategy have at many times mirrored those
challenges raised by irregular warfare, counter insurgency operations
(COIN), and cyber warfare. By not fitting into easily defined categories,
emerging risks and threats tended to be redefined so that they did fit
traditional security concepts, or they were ignored. Concepts like climate
change can be considered either a political issue by military officers or a
boutique topic by academics, rather than representing a wide variety of
change drivers that could undermine many well-established assumptions
about stability, operations, and logistics. So, too, has hybrid warfare been
contested as being too broad, too all-inclusive, rather than reflecting
coordinated campaigns by aggressive states and non-state actors whose
goal is the disruption that many people may hope goes away on its own.
Instead, military strategists should understand that hybrid warfare and
climate security are interlinked concepts, both reflecting the ability of
aggressors to take advantage of uncertainty and change, and to sow
division and accelerate such changes. Both military planners and security
studies specialists should focus more attention on climate change not only
as a threat multiplier for traditional concepts of security, but incorporate
shifts in environmental conditions with advances in understanding hybrid
warfare and new technologies for adversaries to take advantage of these
changes. With climate security discussions largely focused on either
diplomacy or impacts on conventional military operations, greater
integration of lessons from hybrid warfare, IW, COIN, and related
experiences can allow warning intelligence and planning for new
constellations of strategic threats.
Climate change adaptive strategies such as migration can be worsened and
turned into a security threat, power plants under stress from heat can be
attacked via cyberattacks, and possibly even climate systems themselves
can come under threat from more than unintended action. More fullspectrum assessments of these possibilities can assist in anticipating and
warning of where and how climate change can be deliberately securitized.
The examples discussed in this article, from criminal networks and
information warfare to geoengineering, are a subset of tools available
within the hybrid warfare spectrum of potential actions. The cases
demonstrate that global environmental changes are not external factors
affecting the strategic peripheries. The environment is instead the ground
54
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upon and within which we operate, and absent concerted efforts to rethink
how climate change affects strategic security, we will be left preparing for
the wrong battles.
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